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1Abstract
Hedging with a futures market is a risk management alternative available to
producers of most agricultural commodities. However, such an option is unavailable
to broiler growers as there are no active broiler futures. Over the last 40 years
there were three occasions during which futures for broilers were available. Each
of the three markets failed to catch on and was thus removed from trading. We
investigate the reasons for the failures time and time again. Using an econometric
model, we ¯nd that the lack of an e±cient hedge was a major reason the broiler
futures collapsed.
21 Introduction
Knoeber and Thurman (1995) ¯nd that 84% of production risk is transferred from broiler
growers to integrators via contract production. This is due to a lack of the market price
of broilers in calculating grower compensation. From the grower perspective this is a
form of risk management. In fact, this is the dominant form of risk management in the
broiler industry today. Typically, producers of agricultural commodities can use futures
markets, in addition to contracting, to mitigate the variance in the market price of their
commodity. Currently, there are futures markets for most agricultural commodities with
large cash markets such as cattle, hogs, corn and wheat to name a few. The exception,
however, is the broiler industry which is probably one of the larger agricultural industries
to not have its own futures market. But this was not always the case.
On July 17, 1993, broiler futures traded for what would be the last time on any futures
exchange. Prior to this, the very ¯rst time broiler futures ever traded on any exchange
was in 1968, when they began trading on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). But that
particular futures market stopped trading in December of 1980 (see ¯gure 1 for a timeline
of broiler futures markets). This was neither the ¯rst time a commodity futures market
had failed, nor would it be the last. In fact, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) tried
unsuccessfully to market broiler futures during the 1980s and again during the 1990s1.
Onion futures are perhaps the most infamous contract to stop trading. It will take an
act of Congress to reinstate the trading of onion futures. In 1958, Congress passed a bill2
1Iced broiler futures were traded on CBOT from 1968-1980 (BrI) while the CME traded broilers from
1979-1982 (BrII) and later from 1991-1993 (BrIII).
2USC:Title 7:Section 13-1: (a) No contract for the sale of onions for future delivery shall be made on
or subject to the rules of any board of trade in the United States. (b) Any person who shall violate the
provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof be ¯ned
3BrI:      8/68-12/80
BrII:    11/79-8/82
BrIII:  12/90-7/93
BrIII
8/68 7/93 12/90 8/82 12/80 11/79
BrII
BrI
Figure 1: Broiler Futures Timeline
banning the sale of onion futures3. As of yet, this law has not been repealed.
After a brief seventeen-month existence between 1987 and 1988, high fructose corn
syrup contracts (HCF-55) were also permanently delisted from the Minneapolis Grain
Exchange (Thompson, Garcia and Wildman 1996). There are now defunct futures markets
for potatoes, GNMA Collateral Depository Receipts (a ¯nancial futures), boneless beef,
wine, apples and even corn yields. But not every poorly performing futures contract is
necessarily delisted. At times, futures contracts are temporarily removed from exchanges
to be brought back after revision of certain contract speci¯cations. Such was the case
during February of 1997 when live hog futures were discontinued and later replaced by
lean hog futures4. This begs the question: why do some commodities, such as wheat, live
not more than $5,000. This ban was enacted as a result of complaints from growers that futures trading
increased volatility of cash prices.
3See (Gray 1963), (Johnson 1977) and (Higgens and Holcombe 1980) for details about the collapse of
onion futures.
4The contract speci¯cations were changed to re°ect cash settlements rather than delivery of hogs.
4cattle, and gold to name a few, continue to enjoy successful futures markets, while those
for other commodities such as broilers fail? The objective of this article is to provide an
economic history of broiler futures and to explore the reasons for their failure time and
time again. In this article we use broiler futures data to test the validity of an econometric
model in evaluating the failure of these futures contracts. The remainder of this article
begins by providing a brief review of the literature on the determinants of successful
futures markets. Section 3 provides a description of the broiler industry and the futures
contracts. This is followed by section 4 discussing the methodology used to evaluate the
broiler futures markets. We then discuss the data in section 5, followed by a discussion of
the empirical results in section 6 and ¯nally section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
Towards approaching the determinants of successful futures contracts, the literature can
be sorted into articles based on `commodity characteristics' and those based on `contract
characteristics' (Black 1986).
2.1 Commodity Characteristics
Futures markets serve many purposes, chief among which are price discovery and risk
management. Current futures prices are often harbingers of future spot prices. Futures
prices re°ect expectations of traders, inventory levels and any new information a®ecting
either. Futures markets are also avenues for transferring risk from those wishing to avoid
it to those willing to accept risk. Arising out of these dual functions are certain key com-
5modity characteristics of futures markets. Leuthold, Jukus and Cordier (1989) identify a
list of common characteristics of commodities traded successfully on futures markets: (i)
homogeneity of product, or at least non-identi¯cation with a producer or manufacturer,
which makes for ease of delivery of the product if needed to ful¯ll the futures transac-
tion; (ii) capability of standardization and grading5; (iii) variable or uncertain prices,
viewed by Telser (1981) as one of the key commodity characteristics for the suitability of
a futures market, since mitigating price variability is the main reason for hedging with a
futures market; (iv) active and large cash markets which ensure that no one person has
control over the price, thus providing a large pool of potential hedgers; and (v) avail-
ability of public information. Carlton (1984) ¯nds that the underlying commodities of
successful futures markets have freely determined prices and the absence of regulation;
large transaction values; large numbers of buyers and sellers; and correlated prices for
slightly di®ering products. Malliaris (2000) indicates that price uncertainty in a cash
market contributes to the creation of a futures market. Black (1986) identi¯es forward
contracting6 in the commodity as a factor contributing towards the success/ failure of the
corresponding futures contract. It is argued that due to the risk of nonperformance by
one of the concerned parties (producer or buyer) in a forward contract, a futures con-
tract would be superior and hence a forward contract should not be considered a perfect
substitute for a futures contract. However, the ability to tailor a forward contract to the
exact speci¯cation of concerned parties makes them appealing. Garbade (1982) ¯nds the
co-existence of successful forward and futures contracts in some commodity markets.
5Standardization of contracts, only possible if one unit of the underlying commodity is indistinguish-
able from the other, is what sets apart a futures contract from a forward contract
6A forward contract is an agreement to make or take delivery of a commodity at a future date at an
agreed upon price and quantity.
62.2 Contract Characteristics
The literature on the determinants of successful futures contracts also focuses on spe-
ci¯c contract characteristics, principally designed to attract hedgers and speculators
(Black 1986). Successful futures contracts are typically de¯ned as those with high trading
volumes. Du±e and Jackson (1989) theoretically model the relationship between trading
volume and the success of a futures market, under the assumption that an exchange would
continue to o®er a futures contract, if it generated enough volume resulting in transac-
tions revenue for the exchange. Volume is also an important indicator of the strength of
a futures market (Brown 2001).
(i) Hedging: Gray (1978) identi¯es the importance of contract speci¯cation, market
power concentration and the attraction of hedgers and speculators to the market. Telser
(1981) argues that if hedgers want to participate in a futures market principally to insure
against the risk associated with the volatility of commodity prices, then they are better
o® participating in a forward market. However, futures markets are considered superior
to forward markets since they provide a degree of standardization. Also, a forward market
requires mutual trust between both parties since there is a chance that one party may
not ful¯l its obligation.
Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939) argue that one could view hedging as the act of a
hedger transferring risk inherent in the cash market, by paying an insurance premium
to a speculator in the futures market. So e®ective hedging of a commodity depends
on the predictable relationship between its cash and futures prices, known as the basis.
Speculators, who enter a futures market to pro¯t from price volatility, also require the
7predictable relationship between cash and futures prices. Blau (1944) also argues that
futures markets are designed to shift the risk associated with unknown °uctuations in
commodity prices. Using a portfolio approach, Stein (1961) and Johnson (1960) argue
that a hedger is someone who maximizes the expected utility of a portfolio consisting of
spot and futures contracts.
(ii) Speculators: Working (1970) says that contract terms need to parallel cash mar-
ket trade. If a futures contract is a perfect substitute for a cash transaction then the
correlation between the two prices will be high (Black 1986). Without such a relationship
there would be a lack of adequate speculators, resulting in less hedging since there would
be no one to pick up the excess demand or supply of contracts, thus creating large price
changes (Gray 1977) 7. Silber(1981) studies changes made to certain futures contracts in
order to attract speculators.
In our analysis, we consider a combination of commodity and contract characteristics
to investigate the reasons for the failure of broiler futures markets. We use Black(1986)'s
econometric model that captures most of these characteristics. We also conduct our
analysis in comparison to a successful futures contract such as the live cattle futures
contract. The contrast with this successful contract will shed some light on the possible
reasons behind the failure of broiler futures.
7Hedgers desire liquidity as well since it lowers transactions cost, in the form of small changes in price
as due to large buy or sell orders (Brown 2001) .
83 Industry Background
In this section we will provide a brief history of the broiler industry with special attention
to the three periods during which broiler futures were traded.
3.1 Production and Consumption
It is generally agreed that the commercial broiler industry ¯rst began in the early 1920s
in Maryland (Lacy 2001). Prior to this, farmers raised chickens mostly for personal
consumption, with surpluses being sold in nearby cities. The poultry industry grew
along with populations in and around cities such as Philadelphia and New York, and in
regions such as the tri-state area of Delaware, Maryland and Virginia. New York City
became a major center for the distribution of chickens, giving rise to the term \New York
dressed"8. By 1935 annual broiler production had grown to 43 million birds, even if annual
consumption was only 0.7 pounds per capita Rogers(1998). Beef has traditionally been
the most consumed meat on a per-capita basis. Figure 2 displays per-capita beef and
broiler consumption over the last 30 years. From ¯gure 2 it can be noted that per-capita
broiler consumption overtook per-capita beef consumption around 1993. For 2003 the per-
capita consumption of broilers and beef were 76 pounds and 65.2 pounds, respectively9.
But one needs to realize that at the retail level beef is sold with bone and fat trimmed
from the meat prior to sale, whereas broilers are sold with most of the product discarded
as waste after the retail sale. So when compared on a boneless-weight basis, beef is still
8The term New York dressed indicates that feathers have been removed from the broilers, but no
further processing has taken place (Bailey 1969) .
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Figure 2: Per Capita Consumption and Real Prices: Broilers and Beef
Source: 2000 USDA Poultry Yearbook
consumed more than broilers, 62 pounds per-capita to 53.2 pounds per-capita for 200310.
While declining real prices were a major contributor to increases in consumption of both
beef and broilers (¯gure 2), the perception of chicken as a healthy alternative to red meat
may have further increased relative broiler consumption. In 2001, 42.45 billion pounds of
broiler meat were produced at a value of $16.69 billion compared to 42.37 billion pounds
of beef valued at $29.27 billion (USDA 2001).
A shift occurred in the industry when production switched from seasonal to year-
round. This shift was a major contributor to the dramatic increase in the production
10Source: http://www.cattlefax.com
10of broilers from 1945 when 1.11 billion pounds of broiler meat and 19.5 billion pounds
of beef were produced. Finally there have also been vast improvements in production
e±ciency over the last 75 years. In 1930 it took an average of 14 weeks and 5 pounds of
feed per liveweight pound to get a broiler to market. In 2000, it took only 7 weeks and 2
pounds of feed per liveweight pound to get the average broiler to market11 (Lacy 2001).
In contrast the beef production cycle is much longer, taking six to eight months for cattle
to be market-ready.
3.2 Marketing
The process of price determination also varies between the live cattle and broiler markets.
In the wholesale broiler market, price determination is fairly informal. On Fridays of each
week, and sometimes on Thursdays and on rare Wednesdays, broiler suppliers negotiate
with buyers as to the quantity and price of broilers to be delivered the following week.
This negotiation is generally conducted over the phone between buyers and producers and
occurs in major cities and regions. All cash markets are thus regional. The twelve-city
market price is a weighted average spot market price, in lieu of an actual cash market.
Of course, both producers and buyers still use supply and demand factors to form price
expectations.
Price determination in the cattle market is a little less informal. Weekly cattle auctions
held across the Mid-West are still the basis for cattle cash market price determination.
The `national' cash price for live cattle, as provided by the USDA, is a weighted average
11There have been improvements in both feed conversion, from an average of 5.0 to 2.0, as well as
average liveweight from 2.0 pounds to 5.1 pounds.
11Con Agra 
9%
Figure 3: Market Share in Broiler Industry, 2001Source: Watt Poultry USA
of auction prices from ¯ve major beef producing states.
3.3 Current Industry Pro¯le
In 1935 the top four broiler companies produced 30% of the industry's output (CR4
ratio). Twenty years later they were responsible for 32% of the output (Rogers 1998).
Figure 3 provides a breakdown of the market shares of the top ten broiler producers as of
2001. These top ten companies combined to produce 80% of the industry output. Table
1 provides concentration ratios for the broiler industry for 2001. As shown in Table 2,
12Table 1: Concentration Ratios in Broiler Industry, 2001






CR4 concentration ratios have increased in the hog, cattle, turkey and poultry industries
over the last 40 years. As of 1997, of the selected commodities from Table 2, the cattle
industry had the highest CR4 concentration ratio at 71%, while broilers had the lowest,
41%. Another di®erence between the broiler and beef industries is in their methods of
production. While over 90% of broilers are grown under contract, only 30% of cattle are
similarly raised. The broiler industry is vertically integrated such that integrators own all
aspects of production, whereas the majority of the cattle industry is fairly independent.
Sixty-¯ve percent of live cattle purchased by beef packers are done so at live cattle auctions
(Lawrence, Schroeder and Hayenga 2001). Processors purchase live cattle mostly from
numerous independent feedlot operators.
3.4 Broiler Futures I: 1968 - 1980 (BrI)
Given the informal nature of wholesale broiler price determination, it is not uncommon
at times for prices to °uctuate in immediate response to demand and/or supply shocks.
Towards the latter half of 1966, broiler prices were 21 cents per pound, much below the
annual average (Bailey 1969). Due to a supply shortage, the price had increased roughly
33% to 28 cents by February 1967. At the time a report commissioned by the CBOT
indicated that in the 52 week period preceding June 1968, weekly broiler prices had
13Table 2: Selected Agricultural Processors' CR4 Concentration Ratios
Census Year Broilers Cattle Hogs Turkey
1963 14 26 33 23
1967 23 26 30 28
1972 18 30 32 41
1977 22 25 31 41
1982 32 44 31 40
1987 42 58 30 38
1992 41 71 43 45
Source: MacDonald et al. (2000)
°uctuated by approximately 38%. The CBOT argued that this type of °uctuation in the
market price could result in economic catastrophe for some producers, given the already
small pro¯t margins in the broiler industry (Bailey 1969). Hence they ¯gured there would
be substantial demand on the part of broiler producers for a futures market in order to
mitigate risk from such price °uctuations. So iced broiler futures began trading on the
CBOT in August of 1968 but were discontinued on Jan 1, 1981. We refer to this period
as BrI.
During the late 1960s, around the time broiler futures were ¯rst introduced, the poultry
and beef industries were not as concentrated as they are today. Twenty-three percent of
total broiler industry output was produced by the top four processors (see Table 2) with
over 80% of broiler growers under contract with integrators (Bailey 1969). Concurrently,
26% of beef production was produced by the top four processors.
143.5 Broiler Futures II: 1979 - 1982 (BrII)
By 1979, the broiler industry had become even more vertically integrated compared to
the ¯rst time broiler futures were o®ered, back in the late 1960s. Eighty-seven percent of
broiler growers were now under contract while close to 30% of industry output was being
supplied by the top four processors (see Table 2 and (Economic Research Service 2002)).
At the same time the cattle industry saw an increase in its CR4 ratio to 40%.
Towards the end of the 1970s, the CBOT was struggling with low interest in their
broiler futures (see ¯gure 4). Even as trading volume for BrI continued to decline, the
CME o®ered a broiler futures contract (BrII) of their own beginning in November of 1979.
Anyone desiring to invest in broiler futures now had a choice between two exchanges, at
least for another fourteen months12 until January 1981 when the CBOT stopped trading
its broiler futures. The CME would stop trading BrII by August 1982.
BrII contract speci¯cations did not vary signi¯cantly from those of BrI. With regards to
settlement, both contracts required the physical delivery of iced broilers, their underlying
commodity. They varied across contract months and in the size of each contract. Each BrI
contract was for 25,000 lbs while a BrII contract was for 30,000 lbs. No particular reason
was provided for this di®erence in contract sizes. Other features of the two contracts
were fairly similar. So why would an exchange o®er a similar futures contract while
another exchange was struggling with their own o®ering? The CME argued that broiler
futures would be better suited for trading on their exchange since most livestock futures
were traded there. In contrast, the CBOT dealt mainly with grain futures as part of
12Even though BrI were not removed from the exchange until January 1981, no trade occurred after
December 23, 1980.

























Figure 4: Total Monthly Volume: BrI
its agricultural commodities portfolio. The CME felt that traders on its exchange, who
were already familiar with livestock, would °ock to broiler futures, resulting in a higher
volume than that experienced at the CBOT. Sold on this argument, the CFTC approved
the trading of broiler futures on the CME. Figure 5 validates the CME's beliefs about the
suitability of broiler futures on their exchange. Initially the duplicate broiler contracts had
a large impact, out-trading BrI by a margin of almost ¯ve-to-one, based on weekly volume.
An interesting observation in ¯gure 5 is that over the course of the overlapping time
period the futures prices on both markets are remarkably close to each other. Given that
the futures prices were relatively close to each other and that there were no discernable



































Figure 5: Broiler Futures on CBOT (BrI) and CME (BrII):
Concurrent Weekly Volume and Price
transactions lent support to their claim that broiler futures would be more suitable for
trading on their exchange. Alas, this would not continue to be true. As indicated by
¯gure 6, BrII eventually saw a decline in volume and stopped trading by August 1982.
While initial volume seemed promising, BrII never quite had the average monthly volume
comparable to that of BrI. Over the course of their existence, the average monthly trading
volume for BrI and BrII were 2,295 and 2,159 contracts respectively.



























Total Monthly Volume: BrII
Figure 6: Total Monthly Volume: BrII
3.6 Broiler Futures III: 1991 - 1993 (BrIII)
Broiler cash prices changed approximately 33% over the 52 week period preceding De-
cember 1990. The broiler industry continued to increase its output at a rapid pace, which
now stood at 19.7 billion pounds per year. The CME felt that conditions such as these,
i.e. volatile cash prices and a growing broiler industry, warranted another attempt at
providing a broiler futures market. So in December 1990 the CME received regulatory
approval from the CFTC to begin trading broiler futures (BrIII) for a second time on their
exchange. This time around they were certain that the futures market would succeed,
especially given the growing demand for poultry (Crawford Jr. 1991a).
The two traders instrumental in developing BrIII believed that the new product would
18Table 3: Contracts Settled by Physical Delivery or Cash Settlement
Broilers I (BrI) Live Cattle (LC)
Year Open Interest Settled Percent Open Interest Settled Percent
1974 317944 1137 0.36 2553977 3491 0.14
1975 182648 1361 0.75 2263291 1489 0.07
1976 184006 1755 0.95 2636475 2773 0.11
1977 59850 2058 3.44 2804570 1430 0.05
1978 71299 2153 3.02 4659726 1113 0.02
1979 22933 991 4.32 6989561 5399 0.08
1980 8773 773 8.81 6490817 5186 0.08
1981 369 32 8.67 4465035 6284 0.14
Broilers II (BrII) Live Cattle (LC)
1980 41258 367 0.89 6490817 5186 0.08
1981 27323 386 1.41 4465035 6284 0.14
1982 6597 86 1.30 4399429 2280 0.05
Broilers III (BrIII) Live Cattle (LC)
1992 1649 560 33.96 3707721 2082 0.06
1993 53 31 58.49 3148280 454 0.01
be successful if, within six months, an average of 10,000 contracts were traded daily13.
The major di®erence in contract speci¯cations for broiler futures this time around was
concerning settlement. Instead of making or taking delivery of chickens, those holding long
positions or short positions at expiration settled with each other through cash payments.
The value of the expiring contract was evaluated using the twelve-city weighted average
price of broilers as reported by USDA. The following Monday's twelve-city broiler price
was used to determine the value of a contract that expired the previous Friday14. The
exchange was optimistic about the potential success of this new version of broiler futures,
even though 60% of new contracts launched usually fail (Crawford Jr. 1991b). It reasoned
that cumbersome physical delivery provisions of the underlying broilers frustrated traders
13This translates into approximately 200,000 contracts per month.
14All broiler contracts expired on the last Friday of the trading month. In case of holidays, contracts
would expire on the last business day prior to the Friday.
19and had led to the demise of previous futures (Dow Jones News Service 1990). Table


























Figure 7: Total Monthly Volume: BrIII
3 shows the open interest15 along with the number of contracts settled via delivery for
broiler and live cattle futures16. Cattle futures data is o®ered for comparison of broiler
futures with an exceptionally successful futures contract.
If a contract is open at expiration, the holder of that contract must make or take
delivery of the underlying commodity. Two to four percent of most futures contracts are
settled by physical delivery. Traders, especially those who speculate, would rather o®set
15Open Interest is the total number of futures contracts, either long or short in a delivery month or
market, that have been entered into and not yet liquidated by an o®setting transaction or ful¯lled by
delivery. At the start of trading of a particular futures contract month, the open interest is zero. This
changes when a new buyer buys from a new seller or an existing long sells to an existing short, or vice-
versa. It remains unchanged if a new buyer buys from an existing long or a new seller sells to an existing
short (Schwager 1984).
16Table 3 only displays values for years when data was available. Missing years do not detract from
the general trend indicated by the table.
20their positions prior to expiration than be forced to make or take physical delivery. A
high percentage of settlement through physical delivery or cash settlement implies one of
two things: (i) either the traders purchased contracts with the expressed intent of holding
them to maturity; (ii) or they could not ¯nd o®-setting trades prior to expiration. On
average less than one quarter of one percent of cattle futures were settled by physical
delivery while more than 3% of broiler futures were settled by physical delivery in a
majority of the years that BrI contracts were traded. Even during BrII, less than the
typical amount of contracts were settled by physical delivery. So the CME's reasoning
that physical delivery led to the demise of BrI and BrII does not seem to be supported.
In fact, during BrIII, over a third of the contracts in the ¯rst year and over half in the
second year were cash settled due to lack of a liquid market.
Two large potential hedgers, Tyson Foods and McDonald's Corporation, expressed
reluctance to use broiler futures (Kilman 1990). McDonald's did not have a need to
hedge since they had supply arrangements with processors and Tyson was simply not
interested17. But the number two processor, Con-Agra and another fast food chain, KFC
expressed support for broiler futures (Kilman 1990). Other reasons o®ered for previous
failures were that processors had little use for the type of broilers18 speci¯ed by the
contract and there were too few delivery points (Kilman 1990). With BrIII, this problem
was eliminated since settlement was not based on physical delivery but rather on cash-
settlement. Even with these alterations to contract speci¯cations, BrIII failed to avoid
the fate of its predecessors. For much of 1993, BrIII had single-digit volume (see ¯gure
17In an interview one Tyson executive implied that hedging does not necessarily save a company from
bankruptcy (Crawford Jr. 1991a).
18Contract settlement called for delivery of dressed, ready-to-cook, USDA Grade A broilers. The
average weight varied across BrI and BrII. The actual type of broiler required varies by ¯rm.
217) before eventually being removed from trading by July 1993. Not all futures contracts
go through such growing pains.
3.7 Live Cattle Futures: 1964 - Present (LC)

































Figure 8: Total Monthly Volume: LC
Live cattle futures, introduced in November of 1964, did not go through similar growing
pains albeit they have gone through many changes over the years since introduction. When
introduced, live cattle futures were the ¯rst non-storable commodity to be traded on any
exchange. There was much initial opposition from the packing industry and the board of
directors of the American Meat Institute, a trade organization (Schwager 1984). These
objections notwithstanding, live cattle futures have been a tremendous success. As of 2002
22average daily volume was approximately 12,000 contracts with an average open interest
of 103,000 contracts. By every measure live cattle futures have been successfully trading
for the last 40 years, while broiler futures traded for a combined total of 20 years during
the last 40 years. The most recent o®ering of broiler futures had the shortest tenure of
just under 3 years. Why was the development of a successful broiler futures market so
di±cult? We now turn to the methodology that will be used in answering this question.
4 Methodology
In order to probe the reasons behind the broiler futures failures we need to consider both
the commodity characteristics and contract characteristics of futures as is common in the
literature. To recap, the commodity characteristics considered important for the existence
of successful contracts are: (i) a commodity which cannot be identi¯ed by any particular
brand (homogenous product), (ii) a commodity capable of being graded and standardized,
(iii) easily available public information regarding the commodity, (iv) a large cash market,
(v) signi¯cant variability in the cash price. Contract characteristics considered essential
to have successful contracts deal with attracting substantial hedgers and speculators and
the e®ectiveness of the contract as a tool for hedging.
Both broilers and cattle meet the ¯rst few commodity characteristics. Consumers do
not identify with a particular brand of either chicken or beef. Also, both commodities
are easily graded and standardized. The USDA inspects and grades poultry and cattle
as to their quality at the time of slaughter. While these characteristics are necessary
for successful contracts, they are not su±cient. A tractable model, which captures both
23necessary and su±cient variables in predicting the success/ failure of futures is needed.
Black (1986) uses such a model.
4.1 The Model
The model as stated in Black (1986) is:
lnV olumei = ln¯0 + ¯1 lnV ari + ¯2 lnRRi + ¯3 lnCLIQi + ¯4 lnSIZEi + ²i (1)
where V olumei is the average monthly19 volume of futures contract i; ¯0 is the constant;













where `residual riskcross' and `residual riskown' are the risk remaining in a portfolio con-
taining a cross-hedge20 and a portfolio containing an own-hedge respectively. V ar[R¤
c] is
the variance of a hedged portfolio containing the cash commodity and related futures,
V ar[R¤
o] is the variance of a hedged portfolio containing the cash commodity and its own
futures, and V ar[U] is the variance of the unhedged portfolio. This comes from Edering-
ton (1979) which shows that the R2 from regressing change in cash prices onto change in
futures prices is R2 = 1¡
V ar[R¤]
V ar[U] . The residual risk then is 1¡R2 =
V ar[R¤]
[V ar[U], leading to the
comparison between own-hedged and cross-hedged portfolios as represented by equation
(2). CLIQi is the monthly volume in the cross futures market and SIZEi is the total
size of the cash market, measured in terms of number of contracts per month.
19Black (1986) uses daily volume.
20A cross-hedge is taking a position in a related futures contract, when a futures contract does not
exist in the cash commodity.
24In this chapter, we will explain the reasons for the failure of broiler futures by testing
the validity of equation 1 using broiler futures and cattle futures data. We now discuss
each variable in detail to hypothesize their relationship with the dependant variable,
V olume.
4.2 Volume
Let us ¯rst consider the futures exchange itself. A futures exchange is a non-pro¯t,21
member-owned22 institution that facilitates the exchange of futures contracts. Under
its organizational pro¯le, the CBOT states its principal role is \...to provide contract
markets for its members and customers ..."23. The implied secondary role is to \...also
provide opportunities for risk management for users who include farmers, corporations,
small businesses and others"24. So the primary goal of an exchange is to o®er any contract
which would result in high volume. High volume for the exchange results in higher
commissions and transactions fees for its members. While the exchange itself may be a
not-for-pro¯t organization, its members nonetheless are for-pro¯t institutions. So it can be
argued that contracts are considered failures, and subsequently delisted by the exchange,
if they do not generate enough volume, as designated by the particular exchange.
What is considered a 'successful' level of volume may vary across exchanges25. So, we
21In 1999 the CBOT, the largest futures exchange in the US, considered a proposal to restructure itself
into a for-pro¯t corporation, although this change has not yet taken place.
22Only members or their representatives are allowed to trade on exchanges. Member status is acquired
by purchasing a 'seat' on the exchange through a bid and ask system. As of Dec 12, 2003 a full membership
on the CBOT sold for $520,000 (http://www.cbot.com). The price of an exchange seat is viewed by
some as an indication of the exchange's ability to attract business that generally rises during times of
commodity-price volatility and falls during low trading volume on the exchange (WSJ 1980).
23Under \organizational pro¯le" at http://www.cbot.com
24ibid.
25Typically, all new contracts o®ered on the exchange go through a `probationary' phase. On the CME
the end of the probationary phase known as `the Initial Termination Date' for new products, is \...the
25turn to the literature for some volume threshold values. Sandor (1973) uses an average
annual volume of 1,000 contracts as the threshold to determine a contract's success, while
Silber (1981) uses an annual volume of 10,000 contracts as a measure of success. Black
(1986) uses a threshold of 1,000 contracts traded daily as an indicator of contract success26.
Never during their existence did broiler futures average such volume levels (see ¯gures 4,
6 and 7), hence they were removed from trading. But since our objective is to explore
the reasons for broiler future failures and not to predict whether or not they will fail,
we are not particularly concerned with a threshold value for our dependent variable. We
are more concerned with the results of estimating equation 1 in order to check if the
parameters support theoretical predictions.
4.3 Price Variability (Var)
As previously mentioned, without the presence of hedgers, there would be no futures
markets. Variability in the cash price of a given commodity is the main reason hedgers
turn to futures markets. So it would follow that the higher the cash price variability, the
higher the trading volume, such that
@V olumei
@V ari > 0.
4.4 Residual Risk (RR) (E®ective Hedging )
An ideal hedge is one where the underlying futures commodity exactly matches the cash
commodity. Even though not all commodities have a corresponding futures market, one
latter of (1) two years after the date that trading in such products starts or (2) the ¯rst day of the month
after volume of trading for that product (futures and options combined) averaged at least 1,000 contracts
per day ..." (CME 2003).
26Generally speaking, a market with average daily volume of 1,000 contracts is considered successful
(Schwager 1984)
26can still reduce output price risk via the futures market with cross-hedging. This can be an
e®ective risk management tool if there is a dependable price relationship between the cash
commodity and the related commodity futures contract (Black 1986). Compared to an
own-hedge (where the cash commodity being hedged and the futures contract underlying
commodity are the same), the cross-hedge is generally characterized as having higher
residual risk. Residual risk, as de¯ned earlier, is the risk remaining in the hedged position
compared to a perfect hedge where all risk is eliminated. For example, if the R2 from the
cross-hedge regression is 0.244 and the R2 from the own-hedge regression is 0.468, the
RR variable is calculated to be 1.4211.27 If on the other hand, R2 from the cross-hedge
is 0.75 and from the own-hedge is 0.45 then RR will equal 0.4545. The closer is R2 to
one, the more e®ective is the hedge. Given the formulation for RR, the more e®ective the
own-hedge greater is RR. If the own-hedge is more e®ective than the cross-hedge, hedgers
would prefer their own commodity futures contract. So the relationship between V olumei
and RRi should be
@V olumei
@RRi > 0.
4.5 Liquidity in the cross futures market (CLIQ)
If the cross futures market can be used as a more e®ective hedging tool, traders would
rather be in that particular market. Occasionally even if a cross-hedge has a lower R2 (is
less e®ective) traders might °ock to its markets due to increased liquidity. If there are
signi¯cantly more transactions that take place in the cross futures market, the associated
liquidity costs will be lower relative to the own futures market. Liquid markets are
markets where selling and buying can be accomplished with minimal e®ect on price. While
27RR = 1¡0:244
1¡0:468 = 1:4211
27volatility in a futures market would attract some traders, the lack of liquidity would keep
them away since it may be di±cult for them to ¯nd o®-setting transactions when needed.
This being the case one would expect the cross futures volume to be inversely related to
the volume of the own futures market,
@V olumei
@CLIQi < 0.
4.6 Size of the cash market (SIZE)
The obvious reason to have a large cash market is to make available a large supply of
potential hedgers. Another reason that the size of the cash market matters is because it
prevents manipulation of the market and allows for the free movement of prices (Black




Our data come primarily from three sources: the CBOT, The Wall Street Journal and
the Bridge/ CRB database. Data for BrI begins from January 1972. Futures data prior
to 1972 was unavailable and as such for the purposes of this estimation, BrI starts in
January of 1972. When we refer to BrI, we do so to the time period of 1972 { 1980. Cash
and futures prices as well as volume data for BrI come from the CBOT, while all data
pertaining to BrII come from The Wall Street Journal. Cash prices, futures prices and
volume for BrIII and live cattle (LC) come from the Bridge/ CRB database. The time
span for the LC futures covers the period from December 1964 (when LC futures were
¯rst introduced) to Dec 1971.
285.1 Data Management
A monthly frequency of all variables is used in estimating equation 1. While some variables
had monthly observations, others needed to be transformed to a monthly observation in
the following manner:
Volume: The monthly volume used in the estimation is a sum of the weekly values as
stated in the databases.
Var: The standard deviation of daily cash prices for a month is used as the measure of
the price variability of that particular month.
RR: The production cycle for broilers ranges between six to eight weeks. We choose seven
weeks (thirty-¯ve days) as the hedging horizon to calculate R2s to be used in calculating
RR. Daily changes in cash price are used for the regression of cash price changes onto
futures price changes. The sample for each such regression consists of 35 observations.
The same procedure is followed to attain futures price changes.
SIZE: Data for cash market size are from the USDA monthly poultry slaughter and
monthly cattle slaughter. The total weight at slaughter is then converted to contract
equivalents by dividing total weight by the contract size of the relevant contract. Each
broiler contract during BrI, BrII and BrIII was for 25,000 lbs, 30,000 lbs and 40,000 lbs
respectively. One LC contract is for 40,000 lbs. Market size related in terms of contracts
gives an indication of the size of potential hedgers. Poultry slaughter data prior to 1974
was either incomplete or unavailable.
For BrI a complete data set (monthly observations) was only available from 1974,
providing us with a total of 84 observations. We use the same number of observations
29from a comparable time period for live cattle. BrII and BrIII each have a total of 33 and
29 monthly observations respectively. With the exception of BrI, all other futures either
traded or continue to trade on the CME. BrI traded on the CBOT.
Live hog futures are used as the related futures for cross hedging for both broilers and
live cattle. The time series for hog futures are from comparable time periods. Data for
live hog futures, traded on the CME, were obtained from the Bridge/ CRB dataset.
6 Empirical Analysis
Table 4 displays the expected and estimated parameter signs from regressing equation
1. For purposes of brevity only parameter signs and levels of signi¯cance are reported.
The ¯rst row of table 4, labelled 'Expected', lists parameter signs as predicted by theory.
The second row, labelled LC lists the estimated signs from regressing live cattle futures
data using equation 1. As predicted by theory, variables Var and SIZE have the correct
sign and are signi¯cant at the 5% level. However, RR is not signi¯cant and thus not
a source of major concern, even if the sign is opposite of that expected. On the other
hand, CLIQ is signi¯cant at the 5% level and has a sign opposite to that predicted by
theory. The positive sign on CLIQ implies that as trading volume increases in the cross
futures market (live hogs), it also leads to increased volume in the LC market. The same
signi¯cant relationship (CLIQ > 0) is found for the BrI dataset. Since other parameters
for BrI, BrII and BrIII are not signi¯cant, we are not concerned with their signs. Our
control group of successful futures, LC, did not have the desired signs. So we need to
augment (Black 1986) to arrive at a regression equation which will adequately explain the
30live cattle futures data and help explain the broiler futures.
Table 4: Signs of Estimated Parameters: Black (1986)
Estimation Var RR CLIQ SIZE
Expected + + { +
LC +* { +* +*
BrI +* { +* {
BrII + + { {
BrIII + + + {
* values signi¯cant at 5% level; ¤¤ values signi¯cant at 10% level
Before we suggest an augmentation, let us consider the two variables with signs con-
trary to our expectations, RR and CLIQ, both of which deal with cross hedging. The
underlying assumption is that hedgers, vital to the success of a futures contract, in the
absence of a futures market in their cash commodity will hedge using a related commod-
ity28. Having the ability to cross hedge when an own hedge is not possible takes a certain
degree of sophistication and understanding of the futures markets which many farmers
may not possess. The typical reason provided for less than 5% of farmers using hedging
as a risk management tool is the complexity of the futures market (Berck 1981). While
this seems to be a simplistic line of reasoning others have also found that hedging par-
ticipation is positively related to education, o®-farm income, forward contracting sales of
crops and livestock and computer use (Mishra and El-Osta 2002). Still others ¯nd that
basis29 risk, which makes hedging ine®ective, is instrumental in deciding whether or not
a farmer chooses to hedge30. Basis risk is indirectly evident in the variable RR, but in
28The futures market with the highest correlation with the cash price of the commodity being hedged
is used in cross-hedging.
29Basis is the di®erence between the cash price at a speci¯c location and the futures price of a com-
modity. Basis risk is the risk associated with the unexpected changes in the basis between the time a
hedge is placed and the time when it is lifted.
30See Bond, Thompson and Geldard (1985) and Lubulwa, Beare, Bui-Lan and Foster (1997).
31order to understand the success/ failure of futures contracts, especially in the agricultural
commodities, we need to incorporate a more direct measure of the basis risk. With RR
and CLIQ not being signi¯cant, and to incorporate a more direct measure of a basis risk,
we propose the following augmented model:
lnV olumei = ln¯0 + ¯1 lnV ari + ¯2 lnbasisi + ¯3 lnSIZEi + ²i (3)
where basisi is the basis risk and other variables are as previously de¯ned. If there is no
dependable relationship between the cash price and the futures price, then hedging indeed
does become ine®ective. So one would expect the bigger the basis risk of a commodity,
the less the transaction volume in its futures market, @V olume
@basis < 0
Table 5: Signs of Estimated Parameters: Hegde (2004)
Estimation Var basis SIZE
Expected + { +
LC +* {* +*
BrI + { {*
BrII + { {
BrIII + {* {
* values signi¯cant at 5% level; ¤¤ values signi¯cant at 10% level
Table 5 displays the parameter signs from estimating equation 3 using LC, BrI, BrII
and BrIII data. With this augmented model, the parameters from the regression using
LC data are signi¯cant at the 5% level and have the expected signs. Now that validity of
the model is established with the `control group' LC (the successful contract), we can try
to estimate the same equation using broiler data. If the parameters are not signi¯cant
or if the signs are not as expected then we can arrive at some possible reasons for the
broiler futures failures. From Table 5 we see that the SIZE variable under BrI and the
32basis variable under BrIII are the only signi¯cant variables. It is curious why the sign on
SIZE is negative (even if not signi¯cant). The basis variable has the correct sign, even
if it is not signi¯cant. We need to examine more closely the basis for all three futures.
In combination with that examination, we may be able to hypothesize as to the reasons
behind broiler failures.
Basis is expected to converge to zero as a contract approaches expiration. At expi-
ration, the basis is expected to be zero as the futures price and the cash price equalize.
However local basis, which is the di®erence between the price received by a farmer in his
region and the futures price, is not expected to equal zero at contract expiration. This
is because futures contracts require physical delivery to exchange-designated locations,
which may be di®erent than the location of the farmer. Basis risk is de¯ned as the unex-
pected widening or narrowing of the basis between the time a hedge position is established
and the time that it is lifted. Basis risk can result in changes to the expected price from
hedging. The hedge ratio which is a ratio of futures position to cash position for a hedger
is a®ected by basis risk. It is basis risk which is of interest to us, since hedging becomes
ine®ective with high basis risk.
Figures 9, 10 and 11 display the basis over selected periods that broilers were traded.
If the relationship between cash price and the nearby futures price is valid, the basis
should vary around zero as it does with live cattle futures. But we are more concerned
with basis risk, the change in the basis. The horizontal line indicates the level of the
basis at the start of the period. If the basis returns to this line, then the basis risk is
not present. If it diverges from this line, then there is basis risk. All three ¯gures display
considerable basis risk. The variation in the basis over the course of trading is also an
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Figure 9: Dec82 and Feb82 Basis
indication of basis risk. Having a high basis risk, as demonstrated by its variance, implies
that the hedge ratio would not be close to one and in fact may be closer to zero. Given
the variance in the basis, hedging with broiler futures may not be an e®ective tool for risk
management. This o®ers yet another reason why broiler futures may have failed.
7 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to investigate reasons why broiler futures markets re-
peatedly collapsed over the last 40 years. Much of the literature focuses on certain char-
acteristics of either the underlying commodity or the contract itself as requirements for
successful futures contracts. In this chapter we considered a combination of both com-
modity and contract characteristics. We considered trading volume, the ability to attract









































Figure 10: Apr82 and Feb82 Basis
hedgers and speculators, the variability of cash and futures prices and the relationship be-
tween cash and futures prices. A primary requirement associated with the characteristics
of the commodity is that cash price exhibits substantial volatility. Cash price volatility
leads those with an interest in the commodity to use the futures market to manage the
resulting risk. Price variability was found to be signi¯cant in the two estimated models.
We found that our augmented model explained our control group of the successful con-
tract (LC) better than Black (1986). We had mixed results regarding other variables. It
seems plausible that due to the basis risk present in broiler futures they did not attract
the required volume to ensure continuous trading.









































Figure 11: Jul82 and Aug82 Basis
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